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Policy Recommendations 
 
 The West should be consistent and sound in the pursuit of sanctions against Russia. The 
leaders of the European countries should discuss the introduction of the sanctions of the 
third level similar to those used against Iran including sanctions on Russian financial 
institutions, ban on selected Russian-origin imports or arms ban. The West has to remain 
strong in its actions against Moscow; otherwise the stability of the international system 
would be imperilled. The annexation of Crimea represents dangerous precedent that 
undermines the post-Second World War arrangement of the global affairs. 
 
 A broad international conference that will represent the second round of the Conference 
on Security and Cooperation in Europe should be organized in medium-term perspective. 
The original Helsinki Conference represented political conclusion of the Second World 
War. In similar fashion the “Helsinki Two” should represent the political conclusion of 
the Cold War and creation of the new “rules of the game”. Among others, it is necessary 
to solve the problems of Transnistria, Crimea, Abkhazia, South Ossetia and Nagorno 
Karabakh. Otherwise, they will represent conflict potential. This is possible only through 
concert of great-powers. The affected states proved that they were unable to solve these 
problems on their own. 
 
 In case of Ukraine the EU must insist on its territorial integrity and help by any means in 
its conflict with Russia. For this purpose the EU should not hesitate to strengthen 
isolation of Russia. 
 
 The EU should help Ukraine in transformation of the country which can in case of its 
successful result serve as an example for other eastern European countries such as 
Belarus or Russia and which should strengthen position of Ukraine in the region. 
Because future application for EU membership is highly possible and significant part of 
Ukrainians support country’s European integration, the EU should use its enlargement 
policy which proved to be very effective in this field as a tool to implement necessary 
and sustainable reforms in Ukraine. 
 
 This is linked with support of independent Ukrainian NGOs that monitor controversial 
activities of Ukrainian political and business elite as it can help to build more transparent 
society and improve political culture in Ukraine. 
 
 In short term perspective the EU should focus on negotiations on visa-free regime with 
Ukraine and approve it without any delays as soon as Ukraine fulfils all criteria. 
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 The EU should also help Ukraine to strengthen its energy security and reduce its 
dependence on Russian resources, especially natural gas, which serves as a tool to 
blackmail Ukraine. 
 
 Because of its small size and close ties to Romania the EU could use Moldova as model 
example for other Eastern Partnership countries. In this respect it would be necessary to 
offer clear European perspective to Moldova. As in the case of Ukraine the EU should 
pressure on Moldovan politicians to create more transparent environment in the country 
and fight more effectively corruption which is main cause of disillusionment with last 
pro-European governments. 
 
 The EU should help Moldova against any attemps to destabilize the country from Russia 
through its breakaway region of Transnistria or autonomous region of Gagauzia. Signing 
of DCFTA should occur as soon as possible to secure Moldova against Russian pressure 
which was in the past based on restriction of import of Moldovan products to Russia. 
 
 The EU should cooperate with Belarus only on necessary level to avoid legitimizing of 
Lukashenko regime. In this case the EU should focus on help to persecuted citizens of 
Belarus and promoting of human rights agenda. In long term perspective the EU could 
experiment with opening to people from Belarus to promote their mobility and contacts 
with the EU member states which could have effects on democratization of Belarus. 
 
 The EU should emphasize in its relation towards Georgia its possible security guarantees 
against Russia. Nonetheless, it has to insist on the peaceful solution of the conflicts 
between Georgia and Abkhazia, Georgia and South Ossetia and Georgia and Russia. 
 
 The EU should give a clear perspective of membership to Tbilisi. This would not only 
stimulate Georgia itself but also the democratization and modernization processes in 
neighbouring Armenia and Azerbaijan. 
 
 The EU should divide the Eastern Partnership between the fast and slow track countries. 
It has to reasonably use its soft power. In other words, it should support the reform in 
fast track countries through the perspective of membership and maintain contacts with 
the slow track countries through limited dialogue that would enable broadening the 
cooperation when conditions are more favourable. 
 
 In Armenia, the EU should foremost focus its attention on the solution of the Nagorno 
Karabakh conflict that would ease the grip of Moscow and its security guarantees. Also 
if Georgia gets the candidate status, it would represent significant incentive towards 
Armenia’s political elite. 
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 The EU should together with the United States restore the “Silk Roads” initiative which 
was quite popular in the early 1990s but remained largely on the paper. At first, it would 
bypass Russia and lower European dependence on its energy exports. At second, it 
would improve the economic situation of the South Caucasus and Central Asia countries. 
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Introduction 
 
In May 2014, we will celebrate the fifth anniversary of the foundation of the Eastern 
Partnership (EaP) initiative. Nonetheless, it is not clear if there are any reasons to celebrate 
this occasion amid the worsening situation in Ukraine and other member states of the EaP. 
The Vilnius Summit in last November should have marked the success of the EU eastern 
policy and its principal instrument – the Eastern Partnership. However, Russia unraveled its 
new neo-imperial policy and spoiled the awaited European victory. Moscow revealed that it 
was prepared to withstand the West in case when it considered its vital interests to be 
imperiled. Hence, the next five years of the Eastern Partnership will be presumably 
characterized by the clash between the European and Eurasian integration models and value 
systems. This conflict will define not only the destiny of the EaP states but also the fate of 
the European continent at large. The presented policy paper will focus on the prospect 
developments in the EaP countries and their relations to seats of power in Brussels and 
Moscow. At first, the new Russia’s approach to its “Near Abroad” shall be discussed. Then, 
individual member countries of the EaP will be described. Based on that, recommendations 
to the EU are provided.  
 
 
Russia: The Crimean Turnover 
 
Moscow begins to perceive the Eastern Partnership as an initiative of the West that is 
directly aimed against its vital interests in the post-Soviet area. This was revealed especially 
with the escalation of the Ukrainian crisis. According to Moscow’s view, the EaP represents 
Western geopolitical instrument for creation of the second “cordon sanitaire” that would 
circumscribe Russia and slowly smother it.
1
 The EaP was allegedly illogically separated 
from Russia, ignoring the close economic relations, open borders and free movement of 
persons in the area of the Commonwealth of the Independent States. The European pressure 
on Kiev to sign the Association Agreement was according to Moscow disrespectful to the 
traditional Russo-Ukrainian relations. However, instead of new markets Brussels created on 
its eastern frontier a geopolitical catastrophe.
2
 In the case of Crimea, Kremlin was afraid that 
if it should have shown weakness, it would have lost its great-power status. Moscow reasons 
that if the US can intervene in Iraq, Yugoslavia, Libya and so on, it has right at least to carry 
out similar policy in its neighbourhood.
3
 
                                                 
1
 A. Nosovich, “Vostochnoye partnerstvo 2.0: Latviya pereformatiruyet evropeyskoe sosedstvo?”, 
MGIMO Universitet, February 2, 2014, accessed April 20, 2014, 
www.mgimo.ru/news/experts/document247570.phtml. 
2
 G. G. Tishchenko, “Voyenno-politicheskaya obstanovka v mire ugrozhayet novymi konfliktami: 
Zadacha Rossii – stanovitsya silnee”, Rossiyskiy Institut Strategicheskikh Issledovaniy, March 12, 
2014, accessed April 20, 2014, www.riss.ru/analitika/2818-zadacha-rossii-stanovitsya-silnee. 
3
 A. Tokarev, “Raskolotaya Ukraina raskalyvayet i nas”, MGIMO Universitet, March 25, 2014, 
accessed April 20, 2014, www.mgimo.ru/news/experts/document249788.phtml. 
  6 
Policy Paper 2/2014 
 
Eastern Partnership:  
The Next Five Years between Brussels and Moscow 
– 
April 2014 
Russia arrogates the right to proclaim its own “Monroe Doctrine” on the territory of the post-
Soviet area.
4
 Besides it wants to continue with the pursuit of the political-economic 
integration under the aegis of the Eurasian Union that will be formed in January 2015. This 
integration structure was firstly projected as a partner of the European Union. However, it is 
more likely it will turn into its geopolitical rival as was seen in Armenia or Ukraine.
5
 
Ironically, the Eurasian integration is inconsistent with the concept of russkiy mir that was 
used as a justification of Russia’s actions in Crimea by Vladimir Putin in his speech on 18 
March 2014.
6
 According to this concept Russia and the Ukraine are one because of these 
countries being part of one common Russian civilization. Moscow has messianic mission to 
reunite russkiy mir. Unless it succeeds in this endeavour, it will be torn apart and destroyed.
7
 
 
Russia’s policy makers will be at pains to consolidate the new foreign policy of their country 
because they will have to explain how they can support on one hand Serbia’s position on 
Kosovo and on the other annex Crimea or somehow forge together contradicting concepts 
such as russkiy mir and the Eurasian integration. For instance, Kazakhstan wants to become 
part of the Eurasian Union but fears the idea of russkiy mir as it could lead to annexation of 
the northern third of the country that is inhabited by the ethnic Russian minority. 
Nevertheless, it is more than clear that the old foreign policy concept is dead. In the next 
several months we will witness the rise of new and more emancipated Russia’s foreign 
policy that will focus most of all on the countries of the EaP.  
 
Based on several analysis and articles of Russian foreign policy experts and officials it is 
evident that the old syndrome of “besieged fortress” returns to country’s political discourse.8 
Russian decision making process is strongly influenced by something that could be described 
as “Weimar syndrome”. The high echelons of Russia’s policy making believe that the West 
has never put an end to the Cold War and tries to annihilate Russian state. Besides, they want 
                                                 
4
 Y. Gorodenko, “Rossiya imeyet pravo na svoyu ‘doktrinu Monro’ na prostranstve SNG: 
Ukrainskoye gosudarstvo dolzhno byt sostavnoy chastyu yedinoy slavyanskoy federatsii”, Rossiyskiy 
Institut Strategicheskikh Issledovaniy, March 11, 2014, accessed April 20, 2014, 
www.riss.ru/analitika/2816-rossiya-imeet-pravo-na-svoyu-doktrinu-monro-na-prostranstve-sng. 
5
 D. Trenin, “Russian-Western Confrontation: Prepare for a Long Haul”, Carnegie Moscow Center, 
April 4, 2014, accessed April 20, 2014, http://carnegie.ru/eurasiaoutlook/?fa=55243.  
6
 “Address by President of the Russian Federation”, President of Russia, March 18, 2014, accessed 
April 20, 2014, http://eng.kremlin.ru/news/6889. 
7
 P. V. Multatuli, “Obreteniye Rusi Iznachalnoy: K sobytiyam na Ukraine”, Rossiyskiy Institut 
Strategicheskikh Issledovaniy, April 2, 2014, accessed April 20, 2014, http://riss.ru/analitika/2968-
obretenie-rusi-iznachalnoj. 
8
 G. G. Tishchenko, “Voyenno-politicheskaya obstanovka v mire ugrozhayet novymi konfliktami: 
Zadacha Rossii – stanovitsya silnee”, Rossiyskiy Institut Strategicheskikh Issledovaniy, March 12, 
2014, accessed April 20, 2014, www.riss.ru/analitika/2818-zadacha-rossii-stanovitsya-silnee. 
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a just vengeance for the defeat in this undeclared war.
9
 The peace conference after the 
Second World War de facto took place in Helsinki after thirty years since the cessation of 
hostilities. It is already twenty three years since the end of the Cold War and thus the time is 
ripe for another peace conference that would reconfigure the rules of the game in continental 
Europe and world system.  
 
Foremost, it is necessary because Vladimir Putin by his actions destroyed the Yalta-Potsdam 
System and even the fundamental arrangements in post-Cold War Europe symbolised by the 
Budapest Memorandum of 1994. Among others, it is necessary to solve the problems of 
Transnistria, Crimea, Abkhazia, South Ossetia and Nagorno Karabakh. Otherwise, they will 
represent conflict potential. This is possible only through concert of great-powers. The 
affected states proved that they were unable to solve these problems on their own. It is also 
necessary to propagate the idea that the Cold War did not have any defeated participants. 
Every participating state was victorious in the end because they managed to prevent the all-
out war between the East and the West. However, it is questionable that this process could be 
undertaken with the current Moscow’s regime in power. 
 
Russian experts claim that the Ukrainian crisis and the annexation of Crimea were mostly 
provoked by irresponsible and adventurist foreign policy of the Lithuanian presidency of the 
Council of the EU. Vilnius allegedly tried to convince Kiev that it had to choose between the 
European or Eurasian vector of its foreign policy as soon as possible or everything might be 
lost.
10
 Besides Lithuania, Russians consider Poland as the principal proponent of the anti-
Russia policy in the EU. Formerly, Moscow viewed Poland as an American “Troian horse” 
in the EU. Recently, they feel the changed attitude of Warsaw regarding common European 
policy and its close cooperation with Germany in this direction. According to Moscow, 
Polish key goal in the post-Soviet space is the geopolitical weakening of Russia through 
curbing of its influence in the EaP countries and Central Asia.
11
 
 
Any analogy with the interwar period or the Second World War could be artificial and 
misleading. Nonetheless, there is at least one analogy that is worth mentioning. The West 
was not able to stop Hitler’s Germany until it was too late and the catastrophe was inevitable. 
Something similar is happening in the case of Putin’s Russia. The West was not able to 
decisively react on the Russo-Georgian War, it was not able to decisively react on the 
                                                 
9
 S. Karaganov, “Evropa: okonchit kholodnuyu voynu”, Izvestiya, April 8, 2014, accessed April 20, 
2014, http://izvestia.ru/news/568861. 
10
 S. Rekeda, “Litva – istochnik nestabilnosti dlya Evropy”, MGIMO Universitet, March 21, 2014, 
accessed April 20, 2014, www.mgimo.ru/news/experts/document249723.phtml. 
11
 M. E. Kuchinskaya, “Vostochnaya politika Polshi: Polskoye rukovodstvo smotrit na vostochnuyu 
politiku cherez tezis o neobkhodimosti ee ‘evropeizatsii’”, Rossiyskiy Institut Strategicheskikh 
Issledovaniy, December 23, 2013, accessed April 20, 2014, www.riss.ru/analitika/2492-vostochnaya-
politika-polshi. 
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Russia’s stance in the Syrian crisis and neither was on the dismemberment of Ukraine and 
annexation of Crimea. If it does not react decisively on the Russia’s activities in the south-
eastern portion of Ukraine, the catastrophe will follow. For Putin and his entourage money 
and power are the most important value and thus the only reasonable weapons against them 
are deep Western sanctions. The chief mistake of the West was that it did not eradicate 
chekist mentality from the core of Russian power and now it has to pay for it.
12
  
 
Russia represents geographically and culturaly indivisible part of the European civilization. 
Any attempts on claiming that Russia is a core of distinctive Eurasian civilization are futile 
and only hinder the modernization and democratization of the country. The Eurasian model 
of development was fully exhausted during the Communist era. The EU must prepare that it 
will have to compete and clash with the neo-imperial Russia over its eastern neighbours in 
several years to come. It is time for more homogenous and solid European foreign policy. 
Moreover, Europeans should finally admit that it is not possible to have constructive 
relations with Putin’s regime and therefore it has to be weakened through sanctions and 
taken down. The deteriorating situation of Russia’s economy could enable this sooner than 
we now expect.
13
 
 
 
Ukraine: The European Perspective 
 
Size and location of Ukraine at the border of the EU makes this country key element of 
Eastern Partnership initiative. Until now the EU focused on negotiations on Association 
Agreement that includes Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Agreement (DCFTA) which 
establishes free trade area between Ukraine and the EU. Text of the agreement was finalized 
in 2011, but its signing was postponed due to sentence over Yulia Tymoshenko in October 
2011. Later, Ukrainian government revoked its decision to sign the agreement on summit in 
Vilnius in November 2013 which led to mass protests in Ukraine that eventually led to fall of 
Azarov government and ousting of president Yanukovych. In result of those processes 
political part of the agreement was signed on March 21, 2014 and signing of DCFTA is 
expected to take place after presidential election scheduled for May 25. 
 
Important question that arises is where to continue after implementing of Association 
Agreement and DCFTA. Especially in western part of country that has strong historical ties 
                                                 
12
 A. Dražanová, “Západ je vystrašený a Putin to vidí, říká pro MF Dnes známý kremlolog”, idnes.cz, 
March 24, 2014, accessed April 20, 2014, http://zpravy.idnes.cz/rozhovor-s-novinarem-edwardem-
lucasem-dh7-/zahranicni.aspx?c=A140323_205417_zahranicni_zt. 
13
 V. Dvornikov, “11 yavnykh priznakov, chto v ekonomike Rossii vse plokho”, slon.ru, April 2, 
2014, accessed April 20, 2014, 
http://slon.ru/economics/yavnykh_priznakov_chto_v_ekonomiki_rossii_vse_plokho-1078634.xhtml. 
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with central Europe, there is strong firm for eventual EU membership
14
 and leading 
presidential candidate Petro Poroshenko declared that Ukraine could become EU member 
state by 2025
15
. In February European Parliament passed a resolution which clearly said that 
EU Treaty had allowed Ukraine to apply for membership.
16
 Although this will be in long 
perspective very controversial topic, Ukraine will probably sooner or later apply for EU 
membership and the EU will then not avoid giving Ukraine European perspective. 
 
In shorter perspective Ukraine however needs to undergo deep transformation of all sectors 
of the country starting with reform of constitution that was adopted in 1996 during 
presidency of Leonid Kuchma who was notoriously known for his undemocratic practices.  
 
Apart from the change of formal rules, elimination of other informal practices that are 
common in Ukraine is necessary. This includes fighting such phenomena as insufficient 
divisions of legislative, executive and judiciary power, dependence of MPs on economical 
elites of the country or unacceptable practices in Ukrainian parliament such as voting of one 
MP for absent colleagues which was detected after fall of Viktor Yanukovych in all 
parliamentary fractions with exception of nationalist party Svoboda.
17
 Another key challenge 
for Ukraine is fighting corruption which is widespread in the country and it is one of the 
most important factors that make Ukrainian state totally ineffective. Transparency 
International rated only four central Asian republics worse than Ukraine in whole post-
Soviet area in perceived level of corruption in 2013 and therefore there is much space for 
improvements.
18
 
 
To help Ukraine in fight with those phenomena the EU should strongly support Ukrainian 
NGO sector that often focuses on revealing of those problems. Especially after Euromaidan 
Ukrainian politicians are under much bigger pressure and control from the society and that is 
                                                 
14
 “Public Opinion Survey Residents of Ukraine: March 14 – 26, 2014”, slideshare.net, accessed April 
20, 2014, www.slideshare.net/Ratinggroup/2014-april-5-iri-public-opinion-survey-of-ukraine-march-
14-26-2014. 
15
 “Poroshenko vpevnenyy shcho Ukraina za 10-11 rokiv Ukraina mozhe statychlenom ES”, 
Informatsiyne ahentstvo Unian, March 30, 2014, accessed April 20, 2014, 
www.unian.ua/politics/902161-poroshenko-vpevneniy-scho-ukrajina-za-10-11-rokiv-ukrajina-moje-
stati-chlenom-es.html. 
16
 “Ukraine: MEPs urge EU to help financial rescue, but enact targeted sanctions too”, European 
Parliament/News, February 27, 2014, accessed April 20, 2014, 
www.europarl.europa.eu/news/en/news-room/content/20140221IPR36637/html/Ukraine-MEPs-urge-
EU-to-help-financial-rescue-but-enact-targeted-sanctions-too. 
17
 “Dva provladnykh deputaty znovu knopkodavyly”, chesno.org, April 9, 2014, accessed April 20, 
2014, http://chesno.org/news/1869. 
18
 “Corruption Perception Index 2013”, Transparency International, accessed April 20, 2014, 
http://cpi.transparency.org/cpi2013/results. 
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first important step towards transparent environment. In this respect the EU should critically 
rate activities of all Ukrainian political subjects, avoid simplistic black-white perception that 
was common especially after the Orange revolution and promote better political culture in 
Ukraine. It must be acknowledged that in all political fractions including former opposition 
against Viktor Yanukovych there are many personalities with controversial business or 
political past including such leading figures as Yulia Tymoshenko, Arseniy Yatsenyuk, 
Oleksandr Turchynov or Petro Poroshenko. 
 
Financial help to Ukraine is necessary in present difficult situation and it can in short term 
solve worse economic problems of the country. However as noted above it cannot solve deep 
structural problems of Ukraine. Past experience showed that enlargement was indeed one of 
the most powerful tools of the EU and as such it could be also used in Ukraine once the 
country applies for membership. EU member states should then by no means complicate 
Ukrainian prospects without clear reason. The same principle applies for present negotiations 
on visa free regime as well. On the other hand, it is of course necessary to follow all EU 
rules, insist on compliance with all formal procedures and avoid such initiatives as in 
December 2013 when Ukrainian NGO Europe Without Barriers urged the EU to temporary 
lift visa regime for Ukrainians in 2014 without finishing all negotiations.
19
 
 
Ukraine must feel strong support from the EU in transformation of the country, but on the 
other hand it is necessary for Ukrainians to understand that the EU cannot do any work in 
Ukraine itself and that it is no panacea for their problems. The EU can serve as an example 
for Ukrainians, motivate them to transform the country and can also help with finding 
solutions to different urgent problems. But Ukrainians themselves must implement all 
changes and they must be willing to cooperate with the EU. The scheme can however only 
work in the case when Ukraine gets concrete offer for changes in the country. At present 
stage it must be implementation of visa-free regime in reasonable time and the EU must later 
count with giving Ukraine clear European perspective. 
 
 
Moldova: From the Eastern Partnership to the Candidate 
Status? 
 
Since inauguration of the Eastern Partnership Moldova has made significant progress in its 
relations with the EU which was possible because of ruling pro-European government that 
was elected in July 2009. Since then Moldova – although paralyzed by the deadlock in 
parliament due to which it failed to elect president for two and half years – closely 
                                                 
19
 “Statement from the civic initiative ‘Europe without Barriers’ on suspension of visa requirements 
for the citizens of Ukraine”, Europe without Barriers civic initiative, December 11, 2013, accessed 
April 20, 2014, http://novisa.org.ua/en/zvernennya-gromads-koyi-initsiativi-yevropa-bez-bar-yeriv-
shhodo-prizupinennya-vizovih-vimog-dlya-gromadyan-ukrayini. 
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cooperates with the EU and it is supposed to sign Association Agreement and DCFTA 
during this year. Meanwhile, visa regime for citizens of Moldova has been lifted and it will 
enter into force on April 28.
20
 
 
According to an extensive survey conducted in 2013, European integration in Moldova, 
although attractive, has not overwhelming support. The pro-EU camp has even declined 
since 2009.
21
 This is possibly due to tarnished reputation of Moldovan pro-European 
government that faced severe scandals and failed to tackle important problems such as high 
level of corruption. This helps to strengthen Communist Party
22
 that ruled Moldova until 
2009 and which is still the most popular political party in the country
23
. Thus, parliamentary 
elections scheduled for November 2014 will be probably critically important for the future 
cooperation with the EU. 
 
In short term perspective the signing of the Association Agreement is overriding priority. If 
there is enough will in Moldova, the next logical step would be the application for 
membership. Apart from that, the EU should play active role in facilitation of frozen conflict 
in Transnistria. That cannot be however solved without active participation of Russia which 
can in case of closer integration of Moldova into the EU use this breakaway region to 
discourage Moldova from European path. The EU must be prepared for this alternative and 
strongly support Moldovan aspirations in such case. 
 
 
Belarus: The Eurasian Path 
 
Belarus as a member of the Customs Union with Russia and Kazakhstan with its 
authoritative regime of Alexander Lukashenko has always been the most problematic 
country of the Eastern Partnership initiative. Belarus was the only country of the Eastern 
Partnership that has not ratified Partnership and Cooperation Agreement with the EU in 
1990s.
24
 Mutual relations with Belarus had somehow improved after 2007
25
, but have been 
                                                 
20
 “Commissioner Malmström on vise-free travel for Moldova”, europa.eu, April 3, 2014, accessed 
April 20, 2014, http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_STATEMENT-14-101_en.htm. 
21
 “EU Remains Attractive but not Default Option for Moldovans”, Central European Policy Institute, 
January 14, 2014, accessed April 20, 2014, 
www.cepolicy.org/sites/cepolicy.org/files/attachments/survey_results.pdf. 
22
 Z. Alimbaeva, “Seeing Red Again in Chisinau”, Transitions Online, March 13, 2014, accessed April 
20, 2014, www.tol.org/client/article/24213-moldova-communists.html. 
23
 “Poll: Four Parties would enter Moldovan Parliament”, Teleradio Moldova, March 17, 2014, 
accessed April 20, 2014, www.trm.md/en/politic/sondaj-patru-partide-ar-accede-in-parlamentt. 
24
 “Partnership and Cooperation Agreements (PCAs): Russia, Eastern Europe, the Southern Caucasus 
and Central Asia”, europa.eu, last modified September 29, 2010, accessed April 20, 2014, 
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effectively frozen again since December 2010 after crackdown on demonstrations against 
presidential elections. In long term, Belarus participates on the Eastern Partnership only 
within multilateral track.
26
 
 
There are no signs that situation in Belarus can change significantly in the following years. 
As Belarus does not see the EU as a partner for closer cooperation, there is no reason for the 
EU to follow different pattern. Apart from that, there can be however made some steps 
towards helping citizens of Belarus. This can be done for example by mitigating of visa 
policy and increasing their mobility into the EU which can be in long term perspective 
effective tool towards democratization of the country. 
 
 
Georgia: Security First 
 
The new government of Irakli Garibashvili has significantly changed the foreign policy of 
Georgia. It tries to be more rational and to avoid emotional reactions. This is especially 
apparent in its relationship with Russia, as it endeavours to de-escalate the Russo-Georgian 
conflict over the breakaway territories of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Nonetheless, the 
oppositional United National Movement still supports the concept of occupied territories. 
Garibashvili presumes that the better its relations with Russia will become, the easier it will 
be for him to pursue his main goal of the European integration. Mikhail Saakhashvili’s 
policy towards Russia and the EU was based on completely reversed assumption. In other 
words, if the relations between Russia and the West are bad, it would facilitate Georgia’s 
accession into the EU and NATO.
27
 
 
Georgia does not want to be a hostage of the relations between the West and Moscow. This 
is clearly visible on the stance of Tbilisi on the Ukrainian crisis as it distances itself from it. 
Georgia’s politicians do not want to risk the planned summit of Russian and Georgian 
presidents and the regular meetings between Russian Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs 
Gregori Karasin and Georgian Prime Minister's Special Representative in Relations with 
Russia Zurab Abashidze. The language situation is also very different from Ukraine. 
Georgia’s language minorities have their own educational system and their use of mother 
                                                                                                                                          
http://europa.eu/legislation_summaries/external_relations/relations_with_third_countries/eastern_euro
pe_and_central_asia/r17002_en.htm. 
25
 “Belarus”, Eastern Partnership Community, accessed April 20, 2014, 
www.easternpartnership.org/partner-states/belarus. 
26
 “Belarus”, European Union External Action Service, accessed April 20, 2014, 
http://eeas.europa.eu/belarus/index_en.htm. 
27
 K. Gadzhiyeva, “Vliyanie sobytiy na Ukraine na rossiysko-gruzinskiye otnosheniya yavlyayetsya 
minimalnym, schitayut eksperty”, Kavkazskiy Uzel, March 29, 2014, accessed April 20, 2014, 
www.kavkaz-uzel.ru/articles/240196. 
  13 
Policy Paper 2/2014 
 
Eastern Partnership:  
The Next Five Years between Brussels and Moscow 
– 
April 2014 
tongue is not inhibited. In the contrast to Ukraine, Georgia has created efficient state 
apparatus and the level of corruption is decreasing. Above all, Georgia is not important for 
Russia per se, but for Moscow is important that it will not access NATO in the near future.
28
 
This enables the de-escalation of the Russo-Georgian relations in present but could support 
their deterioration in the years to come because Tbilisi is not going to sacrifice the prospect 
of membership in the Euro-Atlantic integration structures for Russia’s favour. 
 
Georgia sees the signing of the Association Agreement with the EU as confirmation of its 
progress towards the West and it is less interested in the specific obligations or advantages 
that this document brings. The overriding priority for Georgia’s policy makers is maintaining 
their European vector of foreign policy. Moreover, they perceive in both NATO and the EU 
predominantly their security aspect as they foremost want to safeguard their country. 
Regarding the separatist regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, Moscow believes that 
Tbilisi – by initialling of the Association Agreement with the EU – acknowledged the loss of 
its territory. The eventual accession into the EU could allegedly even deepen this process.
29
 
Obviously, Tbilisi does not see it in this light and believes that the improvement of its 
economic performance could pull up both breakaway territories. In the oncoming years will 
be also very important to distinguish between Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Abkhazia has 
a professional political leadership and national project that counts with the establishment of 
independent and prosperous country. While South Ossetian political elite is rather 
unprofessional and lacks visions.
30
 According to opinion polls one third of South Ossetians 
prefer independence, one third is for the union with North Ossetia and the last third wants to 
be part of the Russian Federation but as an individual subject of federation.
31
 
 
In any case, the EU should emphasize on its relation towards Georgia its possible security 
guarantees against Russia. Nonetheless, it has to insist on the peaceful solution of the 
conflicts between Georgia and Abkhazia, Georgia and South Ossetia and Georgia and 
Russia. Moreover, it should give Tbilisi clear perspective of membership. This would not 
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only stimulate Georgia itself but also the democratization and modernization processes in 
neighbouring Armenia and Azerbaijan. 
 
 
Armenia: Is Second Maidan Possible? 
 
After Armenia’s turnover on Russia in September 2013, the country chose the path of 
Eurasian integration. If Yerevan really joins the Customs and Eurasian Unions, it would 
represent significant loss of its sovereignty.
32
 The negotiations on the Association Agreement 
and the DCFTA are postponed indefinitely. It should be underlined that Russia’s pressure on 
Armenia in 2013 is comparable only with the Russian invasion into Georgia in 2008 and 
with the annexation of Crimea in 2014. 
 
This pressure has twofold explanation. Firstly, Moscow wanted to retain Armenia in its 
sphere of influence at any costs. Secondly, it was probably meant as sort of warning for other 
states on Russia’s orbit. Yerevan’s security is heavily dependent on Russia’s security 
guarantees against its enemy Azerbaijan. Armenia is the only South Caucasian member of 
the Collective Security Treaty Organization. Moreover, it hosts Russia’s military base in 
Gyumri. Russia was willing to annex Crimea in order to – inter alia – maintain the position 
of its Black Sea Fleet, so it is quite logical that it politically and economically pressured 
Armenia in order to preserve its position in Gyumri. Above all, Russia is the largest trade 
partner and investor in Armenia.
33
 Therefore, it was easy for Moscow to intimidate Yerevan. 
It started to increase the price of its gas exports, threatened Yerevan with introduction of visa 
requirements and even alleged that it might enhance its military support of Azerbaijan’s 
claims on Nagorno Karabakh. Hence, Armenia’s President Serzh Sargsyan decided that the 
European integration was futile and returned to Russia’s fold. 
 
Russia also initiated a plan to build a highway and railroad through Abkhazia, Georgia and 
Armenia to Iran. This project would significantly lower Armenia’s international isolation. 
Therefore, it is wholeheartedly supported by Yerevan’s political elite. Armenian economy is 
strongly affected by the fact that its borders with Azerbaijan and its ally Turkey have been 
since the inception of the 1990s sealed off as a consequence of the Nagorno Karabakh War. 
Although it does not seem as likely at present, Kremlin fears the most the possibility of 
another Maidan in Yerevan because then it would lose the entire South Caucasus. Georgia is 
nowadays firmly pro-Western and Azerbaijan is too strong to be intimidated as easily as 
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Armenia. The only way how Moscow can daunt Baku is through the Nagorno Karabakh 
conflict that is possible only when Armenia is under Russia’s control.34 Therefore, the EU 
should divide the Eastern Partnership between the fast and slow track countries. In Armenia 
it should foremost focus its attention on the solution of the Nagorno Karabakh conflict that 
would ease the grip of Moscow and its security guarantees. Also if Georgia gets the 
candidate status, it would represent significant incentive towards Armenia’s political elite. 
 
 
Azerbaijan: The Advantage of Choice 
 
At the first glance, Azerbaijan is part of the EaP only by mistake. In last few years it is more 
similar to the autocratic Muslim states of the Persian Gulf. The main pillar of the relations 
between Brussels and Baku is not the European integration but rather the energy security of 
the European bloc. Ilham Aliyev’s family and his entourage administer the country as 
a colossal energy enterprise. Obviously, the profit comes first. Therefore, Baku does not 
wish to aggravate its relations with neither of its customers. Azerbaijan can afford its 
ambitious foreign policy of balancing amongst the West, Russia and Iran thanks to its vast 
reserves of hydrocarbons.
35
 
 
At present, the negotiations between the EU and Azerbaijan on the Association Agreement 
are under way but their successful conclusion is rather dubious. The signing of this 
agreement is dependent on the state of human rights in Azerbaijan. Baku is not even trying to 
implement the commitments that are connected with its membership in the Council of 
Europe and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe. The persecutions of 
independent and oppositional journalists are common and there are also many political 
prisoners in Azeri prisons.
36
 The presidential elections in October 2013 were reminiscent of a 
political farce as the official results were even published before the opening of polling 
stations. Moreover, the negotiations on the DCFTA could not even be initiated as Azerbaijan 
is not a member of the World Trade Organization. 
 
The EU should together with the United States restore the “Silk Roads” initiative which was 
quite popular in the early 1990s but remained largely on the paper. At first, it would bypass 
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Russia and lower European dependence on its energy exports. At second, it would improve 
the economic situation of the South Caucasus and Central Asia countries. At third, it would 
secure Baku’s affiliation and European position in the country. Unfortunately, in the new 
game that was initiated by Moscow in the beginning of 2014, the geopolitical interests go 
first and human rights last. 
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ASSOCIATION FOR INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS – AMO  
The Association for International Affairs – AMO is a preeminent independent think-tank in 
the Czech Republic in the field of foreign policy. Since 1997, the mission of AMO has been 
to contribute to a deeper understanding of international affairs through a broad range of 
educational and research activities. Today, AMO represents a unique and transparent 
platform in which academics, business people, policy makers, diplomats, the media and 
NGOs can interact in an open and impartial environment. 
 
In order to achieve its goals AMO strives to: 
 formulate and publish briefings, research and policy papers; 
 arrange international conferences, expert seminars, roundtables, public debates; 
 organize educational projects; 
 present critical assessment and comments on current events for local and 
international press; 
 create vital conditions for growth of a new expert generation; 
 support the interest in international relations among broad public; 
 cooperate with like-minded local and international institutions. 
 
RESEARCH CENTER 
Founded in October 2003, the AMO’s Research Center has been dedicated to pursuing 
research and raising public awareness of international affairs, security and foreign policy. 
The Research Center strives to identify and analyze issues crucial to Czech foreign policy 
and the country‘s position in the world. To this end, the Research Center produces 
independent analyses; encourages expert and public debate on international affairs; and 
suggests solutions to tackle problems in today‘s world. The Center‘s activities can be divided 
into two main areas: first, it undertakes research and analysis of foreign policy issues and 
comments on AMO blog; and second, it fosters dialogue with the policy-makers, expert 
community, and broad public. 
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